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THE Negociations FOR A *Treaty of Peace*, In 1709. CONSIDER'D, In a Third Letter TO A *Tory*-Member.

Part the First.

Juſtitiæne prius mirer, Belline Laboram?

The Second Edition.

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BL

* * * *Decemb.* 22. 1710.

SIR,

SINCE you are pleas'd to ſay you have receiv'd Satisfaction in what I have written of the *Management of the War*, I will now give you the fair and plain Account, you deſire, of what has been doing theſe Two Years, with Reſpect to Peace: And I will ſhew you how the Negotiations at the *Hague* and *Gertruydenberg* came both to fail of the Succeſs that was expected from them. This is a Task which, I confeſs, at this time I ſhould wiſh to be excus'd from; ſince you own your ſelf convinc'd, from the D. of *M.*'s Conduct in the War, that no particular Blame can lye upon him, with Relation to a Peace; which was all I undertook to prove to you: But I am on ſo many Occaſions made ſenſible, how very little this Affair is underſtood, that I can't refuſe telling you what I know of it. I every Day meet with ſomething or other that convinces me, how much this Matter wants to be explain'd; there being no Point that People are ſo uneaſy at, or ſo much in the dark about, and conſequently in which they can be ſo eaſily impos'd on by the falſe

Inſinuations of thoſe, whoſe Intereſt it is to lay all the Load they can upon the late M. which they can do no way more effectually, than by repreſenting them engag'd in a black Deſign to perpetuate the War, and the D. of *M.* at the Head of it. This is a Calumny they are concern'd to faſten on him and his Friends, on a double Account; not only to juſtify their ſtrange hard Uſage of them, but to remove from themſelves the *Odium* they have Reaſon to fear, may in a little time lie heavily upon them, notwithſtanding their preſent Majority. For if the Fruits of ſo Glorious a War ſhould be loſt, which they ſeem already apprehenſive of, and we ſhould be at laſt forc'd to ſubmit to an ill Peace, they know True *Britains* will be apt to ask the Reaſon of it; and therefore theſe Gentlemen are already fencing againſt the evil Day, by throwing, if they can, upon the Old M the Blame which muſt otherwiſe fall upon themſelves: And that it can fall no where elſe, you will be ſoon ſatisfy'd, when I have ſhewn you, that the ill Succeſs of theſe Negotiations is owing to no wrong Conduct in the D. of *M.* or in any other Perſon concern'd in them on the part of the Allies; but that inſtead of Reproach and Blame, all their Miniſters employ'd in this Affair, have deſerv'd the greateſt Commendation and Eſteem for the Fairneſs, Unanimity, and Steddineſs they have acted with, to the great Diſappointment of the Enemy, who had Reaſon and Experience enough on their ſide, to flatter themſelves, that in an Alliance conſiſting of ſo many parts, and of ſuch different

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rent Intereſts, ſome might be tempted, by the large Offers made them, to deſert the Common Cauſe; which wou'd force the reſt to comply on cheaper Terms. *France* has not on this Occaſion been wanting to it ſelf, in repeating and improving, if poſſible, its uſual Artifices: What has rendred them unſucceſsful, is an unuſual Firmneſs on the Part of the Allies, who have bravely rejected all Separate Views, and have perſiſted to act with one Spirit in Defence of ſo good a Cauſe.

I need not tell you, what Advantage a ſingle Power has over a Confederacy, in treating of Peace, as well as in making War; eſpecially when *France* is that ſingle Power. The *French* have ſhewn for more than half a Century, that there is no Artifice ſo baſe, they won't employ to compaſs their Ends; no Promiſes ſo fair, no Aſſeverations ſo ſolemn, they won't make, to amuſe and divide thoſe they treat with. They are ſo far from keeping the Treaties they make, that they intend to break them at the very time they are making them: They have never in any one Treaty, ſince that of *Munſter*, troubled themſelves with executing what had been promis'd in the moſt ample Words, after the Treaty was once ſign'd: Nay, ſometimes after they had induc'd the Principal Allies to conſent to a Treaty, they have in the very firſt Congreſs for a General Peace, diſcover'd their Inſincerity. This, one who is ſo well acquainted as you are with the Hiſtory of *Europe*, knows to be true of all the Treaties *France* has made for theſe laſt 50 Years.

To go no further back than the Treaty of *Reſwick*, which is freſh in every Bodies Memory; the *French* were not content, not to execute great part of what by that Treaty they were oblig'd to, and to execute other Parts of it in ſo ſcandalous a manner, as defeated in great meaſure the Intention of the Articles; but at the very firſt open Conference, they ſhew'd what was to be expected from them: What they had promis'd as the Foundation of the Treaty, both at the *Hague*, and at the Court of *Sweden*, who were to be the Mediators, they not only refus'd to comply with, but utterly diſown'd the having ever promis'd, becauſe it was Verbal only, and could not be ſhewn under their Hand. And with reſpect to *England* in particular, 'tis notorious that when my Lord *Portland* demanded the Removal of the *Engliſh* Court from St. *Germans*, according to what Mareſchal *Boufflers* had in the Name of the King agreed to; the King, when the Mareſchal could not deny the Promiſe, deny'd his having given him any Authority to make it. But this is a Fault that will, I know, be eaſily forgiven the *French* King by ſome Men, for the ſake of a Correſpondence which could not ſo eaſily be carry'd on, if the St. *Germans* Court were remov'd farther off. Freſher ſtill in our Memories, is the ſtrange Part the *French* acted in the famous Treaty of Partition. They were not only ſolliciting at *Madrid* a Will in favour of *France*, at the time the Treaty was making; but the very Treaty it ſelf, was the great Argument made uſe of, to induce the *Spaniſh* Court

Court to conſent to ſuch a Will, as the only way to prevent the Partition they were ſo averſe to. And to compleat the Perfidiouſneſs of *France* in this Affair, when the late King, upon notice of what Mareſchal *Harcourt* was doing at *Madrid*, ſent a Miniſter Expreſs to *Verſailles* to complain of it, the King of *France* not only deny'd his knowing any thing of the Matter, but under his Hand declar'd, in a Letter to the late King, That tho' a Will ſhould be made in favour of his Family, he would take no Advantage of it, but adhere to the Partition. This is the Prince we have been theſe two Years treating with; whoſe many Breaches of Publick Faith, and baſe Artifices, *Europe* has ſuffer'd ſo much by, that no body, who is in earneſt for a good Peace, can wonder that the Allies think no Care and Circumſpection too great not to be deceiv'd any more: at leaſt, not in ſo important a Point as the Reſtitueion of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy; upon which the Safety, and Liberty of us and our Allies, and I may add of all *Europe*, ſo much depend.

France could never have ſo great a Temptation to deceive, as now; ſince, unleſs they can deceive us, the Point they have been labouring for above 60 Years, muſt be loſt; the Uſurpation of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy being the Grand Intrigue, by which they have govern'd all their Motions ſince the Treaty of *Munſter*: For it was with this View, as we ſee by the Memoirs lately publiſh'd of that Treaty, that Cardinal *Mazarin* preſs'd the *Spaniſh* Match; whoſe Words in a Letter to the *French* Plenipotentiaries in *Jan.*

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46. are ſo remarkable, that I can't forbear tranſcribing them. *The Infanta*, ſays he, *being Marry'd to His Majeſty, we may pretend to the Succeſſion of thoſe Kingdoms*, notwithſtanding any *Renunciation* they may force him to make of it. *L'Infante etant Marieé à ſa Majeſte, nous pourrions aſpirer à la Succeſſion des Royaumes d'Eſpagne, quelque* RENUNCIATION *qu'on lui en fit faire.* Such is the Conſcience of the Cardinal, ſuch the Juſtice and Goodneſs of the Cauſe, the King of *France* has ſpent ſo much Blood and Treaſure to Support. And ſhall we not ſuſpect his Sincerity in this Cauſe, to which Faith, and Honour, and Conſcience, and every thing that is Sacred, has been ſo long proſtituted? Can we be too cautious, how we truſt the Promiſes of a Prince, who has ſhewn on ſo many Occaſions, that his Word is not to be depended on? Or can we think any Security too much, in a Matter of ſo much Conſequence?

But as *France* never had ſo great a Temptation to Deceive, ſo it muſt be allow'd, there is no Caſe in which the Allies can be ſo much concern'd not to be Deceiv'd; the Union of *France* and *Spain* being the moſt fatal thing, that can poſſibly befall them; which, ſhould it be at laſt ſubmitted to, muſt, humanly ſpeaking, in a few Years ruin us and our Allies; tho' not ſo ſoon as it would have done, had the *French* been ſuffer'd to take quiet Poſſeſſion of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, and to finiſh peaceably by this vaſt Acceſſion, the Height of Power They were at, when we began the War.

Theſe

Theſe Reflections on the general Conduct of the *French*, in all the Treaties they have made for theſe laſt 50 Years, will, I doubt not, convince you of the Neceſſity there was for the Allies to refuſe entring into any Conferences for a General Peace, till ſome Preliminaries were firſt ſettled, as a Foundation on which it ſhould be built. But before we come to conſider the Preliminaries themſelves, that you may the better judge of the Sincerity of *France*, I muſt obſerve to you, That they had previouſly, by their Emiſſaries, been feeling the Pulſe of the *Dutch*; and by the mighty Profeſſions they made of the ſincere Deſires of the King to put an End to the War, they obtain'd ſome private Conferences the beginning of the laſt Year; in which the Reſtitution of *Spain* and the *Indies* to King *Charles*, was always ſuppos'd as the firſt Step towards a Treaty; and for the reſt, they hop'd the *Dutch* for their Part would not be very difficult, ſince they were aſſur'd, that in other Points they might have their own Terms; and not only be ſecur'd by a good Barrier, in which the *French* were pleas'd to be very Liberal, but likewiſe be made very eaſy in relation to Trade. The *Dutch*, who on this Occaſion ſhew'd they underſtood the *French*, as well as the *French* thought they did them, appear'd to be very well pleas'd to hear of Overtures of Peace, and expreſs'd great Readineſs to enter on a Treaty; but that they could do nothing without the Concurrence of their Allies, to whom they communicated what had paſs'd; and in order to a Treaty, gave Leave to the Mini-

Miniſters of *France* to come to *Holland*; firſt to Monſieur *Rouille*, and afterwards to the Marquis *de Torcy*; who both tim'd their coming thither, too remarkably not to be taken notice of. The D. of *M.* made two Voyages that Spring to *England*, one in the Beginning of *March*, N. S. which was the ſooneſt the Affairs of the War would admit of his Return, after the Campaign of *Lille*; the other about the End of *April*, when he went to communicate to the Queen what had paſs'd, and to receive Her Inſtructions. Now Monſieur *Rouille* came to *Holland*, almoſt as ſoon as the D---- was gone from thence the firſt time; and the Marquis *de Torcy* follow'd ſoon after the D----'s leaving it the Second: By which it ſhould ſeem, they thought they might make ſome Advantage of his Abſence; and that it was for their Maſter's Service, to have the *Dutch*, as much as they could to themſelves, as the likelieſt way to procure ſuch a Peace as they had a mind to. I can't but obſerve on this Occaſion, that the Gentlemen, who are ſo angry with the D. of *M.* have the Happineſs to have the *French* on their Side, in what relates to Peace as well as War: For they too, it ſhould ſeem, diſlike the D--- for a *Plenipotentiary*, as much as they do for a *General*; much leſs can they endure the Thoughts, that he ſhould be both, ſince they are ſure to be obſtructed by him in all their Deſigns, and can make neither War nor Peace to their Minds, as long as he is at the Head of them. Theſe are the Sentiments of the *French*; and in them 'tis natural enough;

enough; but ſure this muſt ſeem ſtrange Language here in the Mouths of Men, who would be thought to be the implicite Admirers of Her M-----'s Royal Wiſdom: 'Tis but an odd way, for a Party to expreſs their great Deference to the Judgment of a Sovereign they tell you they Adore, to ridicule the Choice She has made of a Plenipotentiary. Infallibility, I confeſs, is no Part of the Prerogative, tho' it ſeems to be growing faſhionable of late with theſe Men, to think, or rather ſay ſo; which makes it the more extraordinary for them, to Cenſure Her M-----y ſo freely as they do; which a very little Modeſty would keep them from, in this Point at leaſt, ſince all the Allies approve Her Choice, and the Emperor has done the ſame thing himſelf. Theſe two great Princes think thoſe the fitteſt Perſons to treat a Peace, who have carry'd on the War with ſuch Succeſs; whoſe Conduct ſhews, that they have nothing ſo much at Heart, as the Intereſt and Glory of thoſe they ſerve; and that they think nothing ſo truly an Honour to themſelves, as to finiſh this great War by a ſafe and honourable Peace. Theſe are the Views the D. of *M.* and Pr. *Eugene* have acted with, and 'tis this has recommended them to the Favour of theſe Princes, who from the Experience they had of them as *Generals*, choſe them for their *Plenipotentiaries*. But the *French* it ſeems, and their Friends here, are of another Mind; and for this Reaſon Monſieur *Rouille*, and the Marquis *de Torcy* came neither of them into *Holland*, till the D. of *M.*

had left it: Which was a plain Proof, that they had ſome Deſigns which they fear'd he would not come into; and that in his and Pr. *Eugene*'s Abſence, they hop'd the States, by the great Inclination they expreſs'd for Peace, might be drawn in to conſent to ſome Points, which might either produce a Treaty to their Minds, or divide the Allies among themſelves. This they hop'd to do theſe two ways; firſt, by gaining their Conſent to a Partition, which they had never abſolutely declar'd againſt; and next, by offering to them, in Conſideration for that, a greater Barrier than they thought conſiſtent with the Intereſt and Honour of the Houſe of *Auſtria*. The Firſt of theſe they knew the *Emperor* would not agree to, and neither the *Emperor* nor *England* to the Latter. And from this Occaſion and Ground for Diviſion, they promis'd themſelves great Succeſs. But to their Surprize, the Firmneſs of the States was ſo great, that as they would abſolutely reject nothing, ſo neither would they agree to any thing ſeparately from the reſt of the Allies, nor enter into any Treaty, but jointly with the *Queen* and the *Emperor*; who, to ſhew their Readineſs to hearken to any reaſonable Terms of Peace, that would anſwer the End for which they went into the War, immediately upon notice of the Propoſals the *French* had made, ſent to the *Hague* the D. of *M.* and Prince *Eugene*; the firſt was attended by my Lord *Townſhend*, and the other was ſoon follow'd by Count *Zinzendorff*. And both theſe Miniſters diſtinguiſh'd themſelves in theſe Negociations very

ry much to the Satisfaction of all the reſt; my Lord *Townſhend* particularly, has by his good Senſe, Integrity, Openneſs, and Affability, acquir'd the univerſal Eſteem of the *States*, and all the reſt of the Allies, beyond what could be hop'd from ſo young a Miniſter, and to ſuch a Degree as will always be remembred to his Honour in that Country, however it may be deny'd or forgot in this. If therefore you don't meet with his and Count *Zinzendorff*'s Names in what follows, I muſt deſire you would ſuppoſe of them, what I ſay of the Two Generals, ſo far at leaſt, as to think they did not in any thing of Moment ever differ from them.

But to proceed: Upon the Arrival of theſe Miniſters at the *Hague*, Conferences were daily held with thoſe of *France*, to ſettle Preliminary Articles. In the treating of which, their Inſincerity ſoon diſcover'd it ſelf, and great Reaſon was given to ſuſpect, their chief Aim was to amuſe and divide Thoſe they ſeem'd ſo much in haſte to agree with; That if they could not get ſuch a Peace for themſelves as they deſir'd, the Campaign at leaſt might be loſt to the Allies. For it was very obſervable, that they eaſily agreed, and in a very little time after theſe Conferences were begun, to all the Demands of *England* and *Holland* for themſelves, tho ſome Articles were contain'd in both, which the *French* never dreamt of being ask'd, when the firſt Overtures of Peace were made; ſuch as the demoliſhing of *Dunkirk*, and the giving up many Towns which were no part of the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, at

the time of King *Charles*'s Death, nor had in the Courſe of the War been taken from them. When the firſt Steps to a Treaty were made, the *French* ſo little thought of theſe Demands, that the quitting even *Liſle* and *Menin* was refus'd. But now theſe extraordinary Points on the Part of *England* and *Holland*, were by the Miniſters of *France* readily agreed to, and yet at the ſame time great Difficulty was made with reſpect to what was ask'd for the *Emperor* and the Duke of *Savoy*; tho there was nothing in thoſe Articles, but what was extremely reaſonable, and neceſſary to ſecure the Dominions of thoſe Princes from the Invaſions they would otherwiſe be expos'd to. There was an Interval of ſeveral Days, before the *French* Miniſters would treat about theſe Articles; nor did they at laſt conſent to them, but with a Reſerve, and a Declaration that this was beyond their Inſtructions; and that therefore they muſt ſuſpend a full Aſſent, till the further Pleaſure of the King was known. Now what could be the meaning of this Management, but to enſnare the Maritime Powers if they could, and draw them into a baſe Deſign of ſacrificing the Intereſt of their Allies to their own? And what Uſe can any body imagine they would have made of this, but to engage the Allies in a Quarrel among themſelves, and to take advantage of their Differences, to break the Confederacy, and to entice ſome of the Members of it by large Offers to come into ſeparate Meaſures with them? But this Scheme failing, by the firm Adherence of the

the Maritime Powers to the reſt of the Allies, there was one Article ſtill remain'd to be adjuſted, which in effect included all the reſt, and which would afford the *French* a ſpecious Pretence for breaking off the Treaty whenever they had a mind to it; and that was to ſettle Terms, on which a perpetual Suſpenſion of Arms ſhould be agreed. No body had ever doubted, but that there was ſuch an Underſtanding between the *French* King and his Grandſon, that the Former could oblige the Latter to Reſign the *Spaniſh* Monarchy whenever he pleas'd; ſince he not only gave it King *Philip* at firſt, but had hitherto ſupported him in it. Accordingly every thing about him was entirely *French*; and the Reſtitution of *Spain* at leaſt, and the *Indies*, had, as I obſerv'd before, always been ſuppos'd: And as this was the Point that occaſion'd the War, the firſt thing ſettled in the Preliminaries was a perfect and entire Ceſſion of the whole *Spaniſh* Monarchy to King *Charles* the Third, to be made within Two Months from the Firſt of *June* following: And in caſe the Duke of *Anjou* ſhould make any Difficulty to comply with this, 'tis expreſly covenanted in the Fourth Article, That His Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty and the Allies ſhall take in Concert the proper Meaſures to oblige him to it: What was to be underſtood by taking *proper Meaſures*, both Sides were content ſhould not be then explain'd. Thus far look'd well, and one would have thought, the *French* meant in earneſt that the Duke of *Anjou* ſhould immediately quit *Spain* to his Competitor:

petitor: But all hitherto was Words only, and would ſignify nothing, unleſs the Execution of this eſſential Point was effectually provided for; and there was but one Way of doing this, which was to make this *Ceſſion* one of the Conditions of continuing the Suſpenſion of Arms, agreed to in the 34th Article, to the Concluſion of a general Peace; which was accordingly done in the 37th Article, which declares, That this Suſpenſion ſhall continue till a general Peace, provided the King of *France* executes all that is promis'd on his Part in the foregoing Articles, and the whole *Spaniſh* Monarchy be reſto'rd, *rendue & cedée*, to K. *Charles*, as is ſettl'd in theſe Articles. This Article touch'd home, and diſcover'd plainly, that all the *French* pretended to conſent to in this Fundamental Point, was mere Grimace; and that they meant nothing elſe but to draw the Allies into a ſeparate Peace, and leave them to get *Spain* as they could: This was the moſt they meant, and I am apt to think, for Reaſons I will give you by and by, they did not mean ſo much; but whether they did or not, they did not want a ſpecious Cover for their Oppoſition to this Article; they made great Profeſſions of the Sincerity of their King's Intentions; that he would punctually execute all that depended upon him; and that he would endeavour to perſuade his Grandſon to a Compliance; but that to force him to it, and that within ſo ſhort a Term, was not in his Power; that it wou'd therefore be impoſſible for the King to conſent to this Article; and to conſent to the reſt of the Preliminaries,

ries, unleſs an abſolute Suſpenſion of Arms were agreed to, wou'd be to leave himſelf at the Mercy of the Allies, and put himſelf into a much worſe State than before; and theſe Pretences, you may be ſure, wanted no Art to ſet them off: But to all this 'twas eaſy to anſwer, That they were fully perſuaded, that if the King were really in earneſt in this Matter, he might certainly recall hisGrandſon without any Difficulty; and provided he acted the fair Part, and did all he could towards it, according to the 4th Article, he might depend upon it, the Allies would take no Advantage of any Words in the 37th, to begin the War again upon him, when he had faithfully perform'd the other Parts of it, and ſurrendred the Places agreed to be deliver'd up to them in the 35th: That ſuppoſing what they objected to this Article, were not a pretended but a real Difficulty, which could hardly be believ'd, the Conſequence then would be, that the Allies muſt either truſt to the Sincerity of *France*, or *France* to that of the Allies. As the King, ſuppoſing it not in his Power to oblige the Duke of *Anjou* to reſign, would by executing the reſt of the Treaty be at the Mercy of the Allies; ſo on the other Hand, if the Allies made a Peace with the King without this Article, they ſhould be at his Mercy for the Recovery of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, which was the great Point for which they entred into the War; but which they could never hope to gain, if he did not abſolutely abandon his Grandſon; which they could by no means depend on, while they had nothing

but

but his bare Word for it. Now in this Caſe, which is more reaſonable, for *France* to truſt the Allies, or the Allies *France*? This can't be a very hard Queſtion, ſince *France* has been guilty of the Breach of Publick Faith on ſo many Occaſions, that 'tis hard to find an Inſtance to the contrary. This very War will make two notorious Inſtances of this remembred to all Ages; the ſcandalous Violation of the Partition-Treaty, almoſt as ſoon as made; and the Uſurpation of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, notwithſtanding the moſt ſolemn and repeated Renunciations that had been made of it. 'Twou'd be endleſs to enter into a Detail of all the Complaints of this Kind againſt *France*, ſince the *Pyrenean* Treaty. And therefore it can't be reaſonable for the Allies to truſt thoſe, by whom they have ſo often been deceiv'd: But 'tis not ſo with them, they never have been guilty of the Breach of Publick Faith in their Tranſactions with *France*, in any flagrant Caſe, at leaſt I know of none: But I will venture to add further, that they neither would, nor if they would, can they act a falſe Part in ſuch a Caſe as this. They *wou'd* not, they don't think it for their Intereſt to continue or renew a War unneceſſarily; they are ſufficiently weary, the Burthen of the War has laid ſo heavy upon them, that they wou'd be glad to have a little Reſpite, and to be at leiſure to cultivate the Arts of Peace, and enjoy as faſt as they can ſome Fruits of it. Thus they always have done; they have hardly had Patience to keep up their Armies till a Peace was ſign'd: And 'tis this Humour of the Allies

lies has made the *French* have ſo little Regard to execute their Treaties with them; beſides it muſt be own'd there is a great Probity, Plainneſs, and Honeſty both in the *Dutch* and *Germans*, which appear in all the Affairs of Common Life; and have been very obſervable in their Dealings with the *French* all this War; in which the Allies, notwithſtanding the many Provocations they have receiv'd, have in no Inſtance retaliated, when they could not do it without Breach of Faith. The War in *Flanders* affords many Inſtances of this; that they have always punctually perform'd whatever Articles they have ſign'd; and not made Repriſals, where even honeſt Men have thought they might have done it, without any Violation of Juſtice. But the greateſt Inſtance, and the only one I ſhall name, is their exact Performance of the Treaty of the Evacuation of the *Milaneſe*; when the *French* had juſt Reaſon to fear their Troops wou'd have been detain'd againſt the Letter of the Articles, in Revenge of the Injuſtice and Inſolence with which they had diſarm'd and ſeiz'd a conſiderable Body of the Duke of *Savoy's* Troops, at the very time he was in Alliance with them. I need ſay nothing of our own Country, that *France* could have no Reaſon to fear any Perfidiouſneſs from home: The Character of Her Majeſty is too well known to give the *French* Grounds for any ſuch Suſpicion; and had we a Prince of leſs Renown on the Throne, *France* would have little to fear from him, unleſs he were ſupported by his People; which no Sovereign of *England*

has ever been, when they have thought the War he made unjuſt. But 'tis not enough to ſay the Allies would not be falſe, nor act againſt the Intentions of a Publick Treaty, I think I may affirm, they can't be ſo. A ſingle Potentate is Maſter of his own Will, and can act without Controul; but a Confederacy can do nothing without a Concurrence of all Parts; which in ſo unjuſt a Cauſe as this there would be no Reaſon to apprehend. When all the moſt juſt and neceſſary Cauſes of a War concur, 'tis very hard to keep a Confederacy long together; much leſs can it be imagin'd it ſhould be kept up to oppreſs a Prince, who has done all he can to ſatisfy the Demands of all Parties. Either Honeſty or Intereſt will certainly diſarm ſome of them. No Ally, when he has gain'd all he can hope for by the War, will be willing to continue the Expence of it in Complement to any of the reſt, eſpecially when the Cauſe is manifeſtly unjuſt: No, were it ever ſo juſt, this is hardly to be hop'd for. When a Confederacy is very ſucceſsful, Jealouſies naturally ariſe among themſelves; and they are more concern'd, that one Part ſhould not be too great Gainers, and have too much to their Share, than that any other ſhould not have enough. Of which we ſee an Inſtance, though a very fooliſh one, among our ſelves; our preſent Maſters of Politicks, to render the very Succeſſes of the War odious, alarm us with new Fears, which no body before ever thought of; and tell us, The *Dutch* will have by this Treaty a better Country than their own. And if a certain

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Correſpondence by way of *Calais*, has been continu'd, *France* might be aſſur'd, that no Advantage would be taken of the 27th Article, tho' *Spain* was not relinquiſh'd in the Time ſtipulated; and that therefore they might ſafely ſign the Preliminaries, for that the War could not be renew'd, ſince they might depend on it, that *England* would never conſent to uſe in ſo barbarous a Manner, a Prince whom ſo great a Party among them have always had ſo much Reſpect for: And without *England* they know the reſt of the Allies could do nothing.

But whether it was more reaſonable for the Allies to truſt *France*, or *France* the Allies, was not left at this time to general Reflections. What was doing at this very Juncture in *Spain*, gave the Allies abundant Cauſe to ſuſpect the Sincerity of *France*; that they meant nothing leſs, than the Reſtitution of that Monarchy. No body that looks into the Accounts of that time, and ſees how thick Expreſſes went one upon another between *France* and *Spain*, can doubt, whether the King and his Grandſon did not perfectly well agree: And not only the News of that time, but the Facts themſelves ſhew, that the King gave him all poſſible Aſſurances, that he would not abandon him, tho' it was neceſſary for his Affairs to promiſe it. This, I ſay, is very plain from what was at that time doing in *Spain*; for tho' the Marq. *de Torcy* told the Allies, He did not know but K. *Philip* might be at *Paris* before him, there was not the leaſt Sign of any Intention to relinquiſh *Spain*; but on the contrary, there were on

the Part of the D. of *Anjou*, all the Appearances that could be of a Prince, that thought of nothing leſs. For the War was preſs'd with the utmoſt Vigor in all Parts; *Alicant* was beſieg'd at a vaſt Expence, and other Places in *Valencia* were reduc'd with all Diligence; Preparations were made for the Siege of *Gironne*, and the Army was put into the beſt Condition it cou'd be, to invade *Catalonia*; and at the ſame time the Marq. *de Bay* advanc'd cloſe to the *Portugueſe* in *Eſtremadura*, with a Deſign to give them Battel; in which, againſt the Opinion of my Lord G. they unhappily prevented him. This did not look like a Deſign to quit *Spain* to King *Charles*; but on the contrary, ſhew'd a Reſolution to drive him out of it, if poſſible. But what gave the Allies a greater Jealouſy than all this, was the cauſing the Prince of *Aſturias* to be acknowledg'd Preſumptive Heir of *Spain* by all the States of the Kingdom; which Ceremony was perform'd with the greateſt Magnificence the 7th of *April*, that is, about a Month after M. *Rouille* had been in *Holland*; which Proceeding, you may remember, every body was then alarm'd at; ſuch a Step being plainly taken for no other End, but to lay in Matter for a new War; or rather 'twas a Declaration, That an End could not be put to this, as long as the Reſtitution of *Spain* was made one Condition of a Peace. The *French* Miniſters had but one Reply to this; That their Maſter was not anſwerable for what the D. of *Anjou* had done; but that for his own Part he was Sincere, and wou'd do whatever depended upon him, and that there-

therefore, if a Peace was not concluded, it could not lie at his Door. The Allies, tho' they could not think what was urg'd had any Truth in it, yet to ſhew how far they were from deſigning to impoſe upon the King impoſſible Conditions, thought of an Expedient which could not be refus'd, without diſcovering, that *France* meant nothing by this Treaty, but to make Peace for themſelves, and to leave the Allies involv'd in a War with *Spain*. If it was not in the King's Power to oblige his Grandſon to retire out of *Spain*, they declar'd they would be content with his doing what evidently was in his Power; which was to deliver up to them ſuch Places in the *Spaniſh* Dominions, as were Gariſon'd by his own Troops. But this Expedient was rejected; and the Marquis *de Torcy*, thinking, I ſuppoſe, that the Allies inſiſting upon the Duke of *Anjou*'s being Recall'd, was a more ſpecious Handle to break off the Treaty upon, than the Refuſal of the Expedient they propos'd inſtead of it, he agreed at laſt to let the 37th. Article ſtand as it is now worded; which is perfectly agreeable to the main Deſign of the Treaty, and to the Tenor of the other Articles; but with a Reſerve, as before, to know the King's Pleaſure, without whoſe further Inſtructions he could not Sign. And thus the Conferences held to ſettle theſe Preliminaries, ended the 28th. of *May*, and were the ſame Day Sign'd by the Allies. The Marquis *de Torcy* immediately ſet out for *Verſailles*, leaving Monſieur *Rouille* behind, to whom he promis'd to return the King's Anſwer by the

the 4th. of *June* at fartheſt; which, from the Neceſſity of the King's Affairs, the Point the Treaty was carry'd to, the Marquis's Rank and Character, and Perſonal Merit, and the great Proteſtations he made of his Maſter's Sincerity, was hop'd would be favourable: But moſt of all, from his Deſire to the Allies at parting, That they would haſten the Ratifications of theſe Articles, with all the Diſpatch they could.

Theſe Hopes the Marquis left with the Allies; and the near Proſpect of a good Peace, fill'd all People with a Joy that is not to be expreſs'd. They waited with great Impatience for the 4th. of *June*; 'twas the next Day before the Anſwer came, upon the Receipt of which, Monſieur *Rouille* acquainted the Allies, that the King could not agree to theſe Preliminaries: The Articles excepted againſt, were the ſame that the Marquis had before diſputed, thoſe relating to the *Emperor* and the Duke of *Savoy*, and the 37th. The Allies were not a little ſurpriz'd at this Anſwer, and more at the haughty Air, with which Monſieur *Rouille* in a long Conference on this Subject preſs'd his Objections; a Behaviour very different from what either he or the Marquis had ſhewn before; which there being no viſible Cauſe for, they thought it was in great meaſure Gaſconade; that it meant nothing elſe, but to make what Advantage he could of the Inclinations the Allies had without Diſguiſe ſhewn to Peace; and that he would at laſt recede from his Pretenſions, when he ſaw they would not; and that in all Events,

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they could not on their Part give up Articles ſo reaſonable in themſelves, and which they had ſo unanimouſly agreed to, as abſolutely neceſſary to make a good and laſting Peace. And what they ſuſpected, did in good meaſure prove to be the Caſe, at leaſt it ſeem'd ſo; for after having inſiſted with ſo much Stiffneſs, upon the Objections he had in the King's Name made, when he perceiv'd it had no Effect on the Allies, his Departure being fix'd for the 9th. the 7th in the Evening, or early next Morning, he waited on the Penſioner; and as an Inſtance of his great Sincerity, and Concern that the Treaty might not be broke off, communicated to him his Inſtructions, by which it appear'd that he was impower'd to recede from all the other Points he had before inſiſted on, excepting that of the 37th Article; which ſeems to have been a Maſter-Piece of *French* Artifice: For, if the Treaty muſt be broke, 'tis as effectually done by inſiſting upon one Article, as upon Twenty; and which ever Part the Allies took, the *French* would find their Account; for if they could be perſuaded to give up that, which in appearance was but one Article, but in effect was the Subſtance of all, or at leaſt of the moſt important ones, then it was in the Power of the *French* to make Peace, without obliging the Duke of *Anjou* to quit *Spain*; and if the Allies could not be brought to this, the Point they ſhould break upon was ſo ſpecious, that the *French* Miniſters hop'd for a double good Effect from it; That it would incenſe the Populace in theſe Provinces againſt their Mini-

Miniſters, and ſet the King right in the Affections of his People, which thro' the continu'd Misfortunes of the War he began to loſe: And in this laſt Point they ſucceeded perfectly well; there were no Efforts the *French* were not willing to make, to ſupport a Prince, who ſeem'd to prefer their Safety to his own Glory, and to think no Sacrifice too great to procure his People a good Peace; but their other Point they were much miſtaken in; and the breaking of the Treaty had no other Effect upon the Subjects of the *States*, tho' it be a Popular Government, than to fill them with the utmoſt Indignation againſt the *French*, and loud Reſentments of their conſtant Injuſtice and Perfidiouſneſs.

But to return to Monſieur *Rouille*; when he had ſhewn his Inſtructions to the Penſioner, which diſcover'd ſo much more than he would own before, he took his Leave of him, without propoſing any Accommodation or Expedient in lieu of this important Article; and whether the Truth were all out, and there were not ſome ſecret Inſtructions ſtill behind, was more than any body could tell: And tho' this was his Language the 8th. in the Morning, they did not know but he might alter it before Night, when he found the Allies were not to be mov'd, or that he might make a longer Stay; He and the Marquis *de Torcy* both, having often fix'd Days for their Departure, but when the Time came, thought fit to change their Minds. And what made this the more probable, was, that Monſieur *Petkum*, who had all along, without Authority or Character,

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gone between the Miniſters of the Allies and *France*, did that Morning propoſe to ſome of the Allies, that *France* ſhould give to them 2 or 3 Towns as an Equivalent for the 37th Article, to be kept by them till *Spain* ſhould be quitted to King *Charles*. But ſince Monſieur *Petkum* made this Motion as of his own Head, without any Commiſſion from Monſieur *Rouille*, who lodg'd with him, and the Propoſal was indeterminate, without either the Names, or fix'd Number of the Towns that ſhould be given, the Allies could not take any notice of it. Beſides, had the Offer been never ſo diſtinct, and made with full Authority, to give two or three Cautionary Towns, was to evade, and not to ſatisfy the Intention of the Article; and was in Effect nothing elſe, but to offer a little better Barrier to the *Dutch*, in Exchange for *Spain* and the *Indies*. In the mean time, Monſieur *Rouille* ſpent the Day in making Viſits of Leave, as deſigning to ſet out in earneſt for *Verſailles* next Morning. When Night was come, and there was no room to hope for any further Step being made on his Part, here the Man who is accus'd of prolonging the War, interpos'd, and ſhew'd how little he deſerves ſuch a Cenſure. The D. of *M.* ſent to the Penſioner, and the other Miniſters, to deſire a Meeting, to try once more if any thing could be done to ſave the Treaty: But this Meeting being diſappointed, there was an extraordinary Congreſs of all the Miniſters next Morning; in which the Deputies of the *States* having acquainted them of what had paſs'd, and aſ-

ſur'd them of their Reſolution to puſh the War with the utmoſt Vigour, till *France* was forc'd to conſent to a good Peace, Count *Zinzendorff* thank'd the *States*, in the Name of the *Emperor* and King *Charles*, for the Firmneſs they had ſhewn on this Occaſion; the D. of *M.* did the ſame on the Part of the *Queen*; which was follow'd with like Expreſſions of Satisfaction by all the other Miniſters that were preſent, with very particular Marks of Eſteem to the *Penſioner*, whom I have often thought the G-------*n* of the *States*, for his wiſe and prudent Conduct thro' the whole Negociation. I need not ſay more, to let you know that he is a plain, grave, wiſe Man, of great Judgment and Abilities, quiet, unpopular, and uncorrupt.

Horneſius Godolphin.

All Thoughts of Peace being now in appearance over, and Monſieur *Rouille* gone, the D. of *M.* who was extremely mortify'd at this Change of Things, reſolv'd to follow in the Afternoon, and would not give over all Hopes of having ſtill one Interview more with him; to which End he got to *Bruſſels*, as ſoon almoſt as Monſieur *Rouille*, and ſent Word before to Pr. *Eugene*, (who had been there ſome Days, to give the neceſſary Orders for Aſſembling the Army) but Monſieur *Rouille* was gone, before either the D---- or Prince could ſee him: And nothing now was left to the Generals, but to try to do by the Sword, what they could not do by Treaty; and to make their way to Peace by a good Campaign.

This, I can aſſure you, from what I have obſerv'd my ſelf in the Progreſs of this Affair,

fair, and the moſt exact Information I could get from others, is a plain and true Account of theſe Negociations thus far; in which one ſees on the Part of *France*, violent Suſpicions of Inſincerity through the whole Treaty, working its way by all the Methods of Addreſs and Artifice, which they are ſo great Maſters of: But in the Allies, Plainneſs, Unanimity, and an unſhaken Conſtancy; every thing is open and Above-board, without any Diviſions in their Conferences with the *French*, or any violent Heats among themſelves; even in the great Point of the Barrier, which the *French* had hopes might make a Breach between the *Dutch* and *Imperial* Miniſters: But by the Prudence of the contending Parties themſelves, and the Fairneſs and Temper, with which the D. of *M.* calmly interpos'd, this difficult Point was amicably adjuſted, and the Diſputes upon it produc'd no Effects that the *French* could take any Advantage of. I believe you have not forgot, I am ſure I have not, how People here in *England* reaſon'd upon theſe Conferences. While the Preliminaries were like to take Effect, ſome Men were by no Means ſatisfy'd; they thought Care enough was not taken of *England*; which ſhould make us hope, that they will ſome time or other obtain better Terms for us: And that in the next Treaty more Regard will be had to the Trading Intereſt of *Great Britain*, than the late M— have ſhewn. And yet no ſooner were the Preliminaries rejected, but the Men, who thought but juſt before there was too litttle in them, would have

perſuaded us, there was then a great deal too much, and that it was unreaſonable to inſiſt on ſuch high Demands; eſpecially to oblige a Great King, whom they have always admir'd, to Dethrone his Grandſon; tho' all ſuch invidious Expreſſions were purpoſely avoided in the Articles; and no body, as I have obſerv'd before, doubted, but the King, if he were in Earneſt diſpos'd to ſatisfy the Allies, could do it without Difficulty. Such is the Dexterity of theſe Men in finding Faults, while to their great Diſcontent they are Spectators only: We ſhall ſee, whether they are as dextrous in avoiding them, when they tread the Stage themſelves. They are ſure to have ſomething to oppoſe, let a M. or General they don't like, take which Part he will of a Contradiction, and that upon any Subject whatſoever, whether Peace or War; if he adviſes acting offenſively in any Part, he is told, That is wrong: Well, let the ſame M. upon Alteration of Circumſtances, or further Experience, adviſe a Defenſive War in the ſame Place, That is wrong too. If he is againſt fighting, 'tis becauſe it wou'd be a Step to Peace; if he is for it, he intended a *Counterſtep*. In the ſame Manner they reaſon in what concerns Peace: If a M. adviſes Peace, be ſure he is well paid for it; if he adviſes againſt it, 'tis to perpetuate the War; if to facilitate a Treaty, he is willing to give up ſome part of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, he ſhall be accus'd of betraying us to *France*: If according to his Inſtructions he inſiſts upon the whole; 'tis plain he aims at nothing by ſuch high Terms, but to ren-

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der all Treaties impoſſible. If he acts neither one or other of theſe Parts by himſelf, but in Conjunction with the reſt of the Allies, and is rather willing to hear their Opinions, than forward to give his own; and is ſo far from aſſuming to himſelf a Part that may particularly diſtinguiſh him, that he does not ſo much lead the reſt, as he is led by them; yet a Fault muſt be found where there is none, and that muſt be all laid on him; which were it a Fault, he has perhaps the leaſt Share in. One while we are told, That the War is continu'd to pleaſe the *Dutch*; another, That we are to be ruin'd to complement the Emperor, and that *England* is the *Dupe* of the War; and at other times, That no Side can find their Account in the War, which yet all have agreed to continue, but the General and Five or Six of his Faction: All theſe Inconſiſtencies can go down with the Party almoſt at the ſame time; nay, in the ſame Breath: but not a Word to be heard of the Inſincerity, or Perfidiouſneſs of *France*. Thus the D. of *M.* is with them a *Dutch*-Man, an *Imperialiſt*, a *French* Man, or any thing elſe but what he ever was, and ever will be in Spite of all their Provocations, a True *Engliſhman*; which I am afraid is one main Cauſe they are ſo angry with him; he had too great a Hand in the Revolution to be forgiven; and if his Succeſſes be not ſtopt, he will put it out of ſome Men's Power to defeat the Proteſtant Succeſſion.

But to ſet this Matter in a full Light, and let you ſee how very ridiculous and abſurd all theſe Clamours are, with Reſpect either to the

M. in particular, or to the Conduct of the Allies in general, with Relation to theſe Preliminary Articles; I will ſhew you, Firſt, That if to inſiſt on the 37th Article was a Fault, the D. of *M.* is not to be blam'd for it: And, Secondly, That to inſiſt on that Article was in it ſelf right, and neceſſary in Order to a good Peace.

Firſt, I ſay, That if to inſiſt on the 37th Article was a Fault, the D. of *M.* is not to be blam'd for it. Firſt, becauſe if he did inſiſt, 'twas what he was oblig'd to; he had no Authority to do otherwiſe. All the World knows, that both Houſes of Parliament did the Beginning of that Year (1709) addreſs the Queen, That no Peace ſhould be made with *France*, without an entire Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy: And Her Majeſty was pleas'd to expreſs Her ſelf very well pleas'd with their Addreſs, and that ſhe was perfectly of the ſame Opinion. This Addreſs being thus approv'd, no Miniſter had any Power or Authority to conclude a Treaty upon other Terms, without Her Majeſty's Command; nor could ſuch a Command be expected from Her, without Advice of Her Council: And I belive a Council will not eaſily be found, that will adviſe againſt the joint Opinion of both Houſes of Parliament. If therefore the 37th Article was inſiſted on, the D. is not to be blam'd; he did but his Duty, and could not juſtify his doing otherwiſe; which, if he had, would as certainly have been made a high Crime and Miſdemeanor, as his not doing it is now made a Matter of Complaint againſt him. There is no Room

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for any Objection here, unleſs it could be pretended, that this Addreſs was of his procuring; the contrary to which is as well known, as the Addreſs it ſelf. But tho' 'tis plain, that the D. of *M.* had no Hand in making this Addreſs, 'tis as plain, that when it was made, he was bound by it; and ſince that requir'd the Reſtitution of the whole *Spaniſh* Monarchy, he was oblig'd to inſiſt upon it. So the 37th Article was unanimouſly adher'd to as it is, by all the Miniſters; and their doing ſo, I ſhall now ſhew you, was very right in it ſelf, and neceſſary in Order to a good Peace.

Firſt, 'tis right in it ſelf, that is, juſt and reaſonable, not hard, or inſolent, or inhuman, as theſe Advocates of *France* would have it thought. For what is the Point in Diſpute, but to reſtore to an injur'd Perſon, what has been unjuſtly taken from him? Has not the injur'd Party, by the Fundamental Laws of Juſtice, a Right to this? Or is not the Party that does the Injury oblig'd to Reſtitution, where it is poſſible? And is not this the Caſe of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy? I deſpair of ever proving any Uſurpation unjuſt, if this is not; but if it be unjuſt, does it alter the Caſe becauſe the King of *France* has not uſurp'd it for himſelf, but for his Grandſon? Am I the leſs oblig'd to reſtore what I have unjuſtly ſeiz'd, becauſe I have given it to a third Perſon, provided it be in my Power? Does not the D. of *Anjou* know, as well as his Grandfather, that it is a violent Uſurpation? Can he of Right keep, what the other had no Right to give? Is it not

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kept plainly for the Uſe and Benefit of the Giver? Has not the Giver Power to take it from him? Is it not plain, that his Grandſon has not kept it thus long, but by the Support he receives from him? And if it be thus manifeſtly unjuſt, and the Uſurper has it in his Power to make Reſtitution, is it ill Manners to demand it? Is the *Spaniſh* Monarchy ſuch a Trifle, as not to be worth inſiſting on? Shall we Compliment the King of *France*, or his Grandſon, with giving up what ſo many Princes and States have ſpent ſo much Blood and Treaſure to regain? Can that now be thought conſiſtent with the Safety and Commerce of *Great Britain*, with the Intereſt and Welfare of our Allies, or with the Liberty of *Europe*, which we ventur'd to begin a War for, under the moſt unpromiſing Appearances of ever ſeeing a good End of it? But it was Nonſenſe not to riſque all, when all was at Stake; there was no room left, but to appeal to Heaven, and take Arms; which gave us a Chance for eſcaping the Ruin which was otherwiſe inevitable. This is the Truth of the Matter, this the Point in Diſpute. What then do People mean by all their ſenſeleſs Clamour, of the Hardſhip and Barbarity of the Allies, in obliging the King of *France* to recall his Grandſon? They, who think the Cauſes of this War ſuch indifferent Things, as not to be worth inſiſting on any longer, tho' we have ſo long ſtruggl'd for them, that we have at laſt got faſt hold; theſe Men, I fear, will in a little time think the ſame of the Cauſes of the Revolution too; nay, they already tell us ſo; they are

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grown ſo inſenſible to the Fears they were once in, that they begin to think Popery and Arbitrary Power, innocent harmleſs things; they now plainly inſinuate, that there was no Danger of the Government in Church and State being overturn'd, and that therefore the Revolution was not neceſſary; and in vertue of theſe fooliſh Sentiments, when the Revolution is upon the Point of being unalterably fix'd, they truly are grown weary; and after Twenty Years Labour, don't think it worth a little more Pains to finiſh the Work, and put an effectual Stop to the Return of thoſe Evils they were once, as well as their Neighbours, ſo heartily frighten'd with. And 'tis no wonder, if Men who have contracted ſuch a ſtupid Indolence, and are ſo indifferent for the Civil and Religious Rights of their own Country, can't ſee what Senſe there is in inſiſting upon the Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy; and are ſupinely willing to think, (if Nonſenſe can be call'd thinking) that the Demand of the Allies is either unjuſt, or at beſt very rude and unmannerly.

But further: This Demand of theirs is not only right in it ſelf, but neceſſary in order to a good Peace; and the beſt way to ſet this in a clear Light, is to conſider what would have been the Conſequence, ſuppoſing the Allies had not inſiſted on it. Now to ſhew you what this would have been, I'll ſuppoſe for the preſent, that the *French* were in earneſt, and that if this Article had been receded from, they would have Sign'd the reſt. Which way now, I would aſk, ſhould we

have propos'd to get *Spain*? Can we do it, unleſs the King of *France* entirely abandons his Grandſon? No, certainly; but he has promis'd he will: But is his bare Word a Security that may be depended upon? By no Means. What then? Why, he gives you up ſo many great Towns, which he would not do, if he did not intend to leave his Grandſon to himſelf. Why ſo? How can the giving up theſe Towns to the Allies, be thought any Security? Is it any more than giving the Allies a Barrier, which Barrier they would have inſiſted on, whatever became of *Spain*? How now comes that to be a Security, that the King of *France* would abandon his Grandſon, which he muſt nevertheleſs have comply'd with, tho' he had abandon'd him? Is it the ſame thing to part with theſe Towns, and keep *Spain*, as to part with them and *Spain* too? If not, then his agreeing to give up one, is no Proof he intends to part with the other. Ay, but when the Allies have theſe Towns, they will force him to it. That I deny. Why ſo, ſay they? The Towns are to be deliver'd in two Months; that is, by the middle of *Auguſt*; and then the Allies will have time enough to enter *France*, if he ſends any Succour to his Grandſon. But Firſt, the Surrender that is to be made in two Months, is only of thoſe Towns that are to make the Barrier for the *Netherlands*; thoſe that are to be reſtor'd to the *Emperor* and *Empire*, are not to be evacuated till the Exchange of their Ratifications, which is a tedious Work: Beſides, tho' it be ſtipulated that the Towns

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in the *Netherlands*, &c. ſhall be given up in two Months, I believe no body wants to be told, that things are ſeldom ſo punctually executed, as to be perform'd nicely within the time agreed. But I will ſuppoſe for once, theſe Articles had been effectually comply'd with within the time, and that the Allies conſequently would have been at Liberty to Invade *France*, if they had openly ſent any conſiderable Succours to *Spain*; but what then? Could not they have ſent Money and Jewels to the Duke of *Anjou*, without any danger of Diſcovery? Or would they not have Pretence enough for denying it? And would the Allies Invade *France*, upon a bare Suſpicion of ſending ſuch an Aſſiſtance to *Spain*? And for Men, tho' a Body of Troops could not have been ſent thither without being known, might not what Numbers they pleas'd of the *French* Troops, that were in *Spain*, have ſtay'd there, under a Notion of Deſertion, or have been detain'd by the Duke of *Anjou*'s Order, upon ſome blind Pretence or other; a Trick the Grandfather has practis'd often enough, for the Grandſon to learn it from him? Well, but ſuppoſe *France* had neither openly, nor under-hand, given the Duke of *Anjou* any Aſſiſtance for that Summer, (not that I can by any Means grant it) how long would that have held? Or what Uſe would the Allies have made of it? Could the Troops we had then in *Spain*, have over-run the Kingdom without further Help, or have driven out the Duke of *Anjou* in one Campaign? That I preſume, won't by any body be pretended.

Or could a ſufficient Reinforcement have been ſent time enough to them, either from *Italy* or *England*, to do any great Matters that Year? That, I ſuppoſe, will be pretended as little, by thoſe that conſider, it was *June* when theſe Preliminaries were finiſh'd. 'Tis plain then, *Spain* could not have been gain'd that Year, unleſs the Duke of *Anjou* had conſented to Relinquiſh it: Let us then in the next Place ſuppoſe the Summer ſpent, and the Armies gone out of the Field, and ſee what we are to expect then. A Peace is made with *France*, the Allies have got each of them their reſpective Shares, and have nothing more to hope for; they renew perhaps the Grand Alliance, with great Expreſſions of mutual Zeal; the *Emperor* at leaſt, and the Maritime *Powers*; but ſome of the leſſer Princes might poſſibly ſhew themſelves diſguſted, and think they have been neglected: For, as the Preliminaries are now ſettl'd, 'tis certain more than one of them are not ſatisfy'd. Suppoſe the King of *Pruſſia*, or Duke of *Savoy*, for Example, had thought due Care had not been taken of them, 'tis plain in that Caſe, their Alliance is no longer to be depended on; and either of theſe falling off, would very much weaken the Confederacy; eſpecially the laſt, whom the *French* would be very glad to draw into their Intereſts. But ſuppoſe none of the Allies have any of theſe Reſentments, or at leaſt ſtifle them, and all conſent to renew the Grand Alliance; what becomes of the Armies upon leaving the Field? Is it not certain, that they will on all Sides diſmiſs

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great part of their Forces? Will not the Maritime Powers ſend home the Foreign Troops in their Pay, except ſuch as *Holland* keeps for the Defence of their new Frontier? Shall we hear of any more Armies upon the *Rhine*, or in *Savoy*, when they have made Peace, when the Articles of the Treaty have been all Executed, and there is no more any Enemy to moleſt them, no Cauſe of Complaint, or Pretence for a new Campaign left? I think nothing can be ſurer, than that this would have been the Caſe; the Allies would have thought no more of War in the Places that have been hitherto the Seats of it, nor have made any Preparations for taking the Field another Year. All Sides would have made what Haſte they could to have leſſen'd the Burthen, which during the War they had been oppreſs'd with. *Holland* particularly wou'd have had full Work to take Care of their new Frontier, to provide ſo many Towns with ſufficient Gariſons and Magazines, and ſettle what Foot the ſeveral Parts of their new Acquiſitions ſhould be put upon, with Reſpect to War, Trade, and Subſidies; and beſides the great Expence this would for the preſent put them to, they would be at a very great Charge to pay the Arrears due to the Foreign Troops, without which they could not be diſmiſs'd. Add to this the extraordinary Allowance, which upon their Diſmiſſing is to be made to carry them home: This would put the States under a Neceſſity of retrenching, as much as poſſible, the Expences of the next Year: And this laſt Article *England* would be proportionably

portionably affected with. Now I would be glad to know, what ſhould hinder the King of *France*, from the Minute the Allies diſmiſs their Troops, to give what Aſſiſtance he will to *Spain*, provided it be not done too groſly, but gradually, by inſenſible Steps; and by thoſe many ways of Artifice, which the *French* are Maſters of? If they make a Peace, they may disband 60 or 80,000 Men, or more: And what ſhall hinder theſe Men from going into *Spain* to ſeek their Bread? What ſhall hinder the King of *France* from giving ſecret Orders for this; and when 'tis complain'd of, from poſitively denying, and perhaps ſeemingly forbidding it? And may not the Duke of *Anjou*, by this Means againſt the next Spring, have a greater Army than the Allies can bring againſt him? And how then are we to get *Spain*? Will the Allies raiſe new Armies, and make a new War upon *France* in *Flanders*, upon the *Rhine* and in *Savoy*, becauſe ſome Men have inſenſibly ſtole out of *France* into *Spain*, againſt the expreſs Order of the King; which you are ſure will be pretended? You don't know the Sweets of Peace, or how unwillingly People are, who have once laid down their Arms, to take them up again: If you think the Allies could be brought to this, or that any Armies would take the Field againſt *France*, after a Peace was once made; what then is to be hop'd for? Why, I think nothing more than this; that the *Dutch* and the *Emperor* would contribute for a little while, perhaps for one Campaign, ſome Money and Troops to act in Conjunction with *England* againſt *Spain*;

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in which no great Succeſs can be expected, conſidering the numerous Army I have ſhewn you, the Duke of *Anjou* might and would have. Now if this upon the Trial of one Campaign, were found to be the Caſe, I am afraid *Holland* would not be very willing to continue the Proſecution of ſo expenſive a War; and the whole Weight of it another Year would lye upon *England*, except a very little that might be expected from the Emperor: And what could this end in, but in the Ruin of *England*, and the Loſs of *Spain*? For the moſt that could be expected from this War would be, that the Duke of *Anjou* wou'd offer a Partition, ſuch as I have mention'd in my firſt Letter, but with no Option in the Caſe; he would certainly keep *Spain* and the *Indies*, and give the other Part to his Competitor: And if that be accepted, what becomes of *England*, which is ſo much intereſted in the Recovery of *Spain*? And if it be not accepted, what ſhall hinder the *French* King from aſſiſting his Grandſon after one Year, more openly; and taking upon him to mediate a Peace; that is, to force ſuch a one as he pleaſes upon us? For how can we help our ſelves? Shall we be in Condition to quarrel with him, when we have been exhauſted Two Years more with ſuch an expenſive War, while he has been enjoying all the Advantages of Peace, to repair the Breaches the War had made in his Affairs; to reſtore Commerce, retrieve the Publick Credit, remedy the ill State of his Finances, look into the Condition of his Fleet, and put himſelf into the beſt Poſture he can for

a new War, if the Support of the Duke of *Anjou* makes it neceſſary? No, ſure; we ſhall never think our ſelves in a Condition to break with him; nor ſhall we be able to perſuade our Allies to it: No Part therefore will be left us, but to ſubmit to ſuch a Peace with his Grandſon, as he ſhall in his Pleaſure think fit to preſcribe. I need not enlarge upon the Difficulties of making War in *Spain*, after what I have ſaid in my Firſt Letter: 'Tis eaſy to ſee, how the Duke of *Anjou* may find us Work enough for Two or Three Years, if he do but avoid coming to a General Action; Sieges will coſt Time, as well as Men and Money; and many muſt be made before ſuch a Kingdom can be reduc'd; and that will give the King of *France* Opportunity enough to do what he will, to ſupport his Grandſon ſecretly or openly, or to preſcribe a Peace, or begin a new War, which 'tis always eaſy to find a Pretence for; and we are ſure he can't want Inclination to do whatever is in his Power, which ſuch a Cauſe calls for; nor is he ſo little known, as to leave us the leaſt Room to think, that any Treaties or Engagements can bind him, when Inclination and Power tempt him to break thro' them. His whole Reign is one continu'd Proof of this: I have ſaid ſomething of it already; and therefore ſhall add but one Inſtance, which is a little Parallel to the Caſe before us; and that is, the Manner in which he kept the Promiſe he made the *Spaniards* at the *Pyrenean* Treaty, Not to aſſiſt the *Portugueſe*, who were then at War with them. Never was Treaty made with

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more Solemnity; and yet what did thoſe Engagements ſignify? All the time the Treaty was making, *France* was concerting Meaſures to ſupport the *Portugueſe*; and the King, the preſent King, who was then but Young in Perfidy, had ſo little Regard to cover or palliate what he did, that he ſent in the Face of all the World, an Army to the Aſſiſtance of thoſe, whoſe Defence he had renounc'd, commanded by a Mareſchal of *France*. And can we after ſuch an Inſtance, depend upon his Word? Has he not much greater Temptation to aſſiſt *Spain* againſt us, than he had then to ſupport the *Portugueſe* againſt *Spain*? Is not the Honour of his Grandſon the Intereſt of his Family, and the Acquiſition of ſo great a Monarchy, of infinitely more Concern to him, than the Defence of *Portugal* could be? A Man muſt be blind, not to ſee there is no Compariſon between the Two Caſes; and 'tis inexcuſable when we are ſenſible of this, to think, that a Prince who has been ſo falſe in one Inſtance, can be ever true in the other.

The Sum of this Argument is, That if a ſeparate Peace be made with *France*, upon the Foot of the Preliminaries, without the 37th Article, nothing can hinder *France* from aſſiſting the Duke of *Anjou*; and if he be aſſiſted by *France*, we can never be able to drive him out of *Spain*; and conſequently if *Spain* be ever had, it muſt be by Treaty: If therefore no Peace can be a good one without *Spain*, then the 37th Article is neceſſary in Order to a good Peace: Which is the Point I was to prove. I know but one thing

can be ſaid againſt what I have advanc'd upon this Head; and that is, That the Allies, tho' they make Peace with *France*, ſhould ſtill keep up their Armies, and then *France* won't dare to give the Duke of *Anjou* any great Aſſiſtance: But Firſt, I have already ſhewn, that this is a very unreaſonable Suppoſition; the Allies moſt certainly would not continue to keep up their Armies, were a Peace with *France* once made: But let us now ſuppoſe they would, how will this mend the Matter? If we keep on Foot as great Armies as we have now, we ſhould be no more at Liberty to ſend Men to *Spain*, than we are now: And if we ſent any conſiderable Number to *Spain*, they wou'd be wanted elſewhere; and the K. of *France* would have nothing to fear from us, for want of a ſufficient Strength to act offenſively, in Caſe we ſhould think our ſelves ſufficiently provok'd to it, by any thing he does in Violation of the Treaty; nay, conſidering the Number of Towns given up to the Allies, which all muſt have Gariſons in them; and thoſe not very ſmall ones to keep their new Subjects in Awe, we ſhould want a greater Army in *Flanders* than before, to be in a Condition to act offenſively: And if ſuch Armies muſt be kept up, I can't ſee why they ſhould not be employ'd; that is, why we may not as well continue the War; or to what Purpoſe we ſhould make Peace. To me, continuing the War ſeems much more eligible, than ſuch a Peace, for this plain Reaſon, that *France* would certainly make a great Advantage of Peace, while we muſt, under the Name of Peace, continue in a

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State of War, without the Fruits of it. For Example, all we have done this Campaign, would upon that Suppoſition have been undone; and we ſhould have been ſo much farther off than we are, from putting *France* under a Neceſſity to give us *Spain*. For tho' the Succeſſes of this Year have been ſo ſlighted, as to be thought not worth mentioning, where one would have moſt expected it; I can tell you, *Doway* alone is in the Opinion of *France*, of that mighty Conſequence, that in all the Negotiations that have been carry'd on, ſince the Refuſal of the Preliminaries, to find an Expedient for the 37th Article, *Doway* has always been excepted out of the Number of the Towns that they have pretended to give as an equivalent. Now this and the other Conqueſts of this Campaign, have brought us much nearer to our End, than if our Armies had gone out of the Field, as they came in, and had done nothing. I muſt therefore ſtill maintain, that upon all Suppoſitions, the 37th Article is neceſſary in Order to a good Peace; unleſs ſome real Expedient could be found out, which has hitherto been in vain look'd for: But that and what elſe has been done towards a Peace, ſince the Preliminaries were rejected, I muſt reſerve for another Letter. I ſhall conclude this with ſhewing you, what at firſt Sight you will think very ſtrange; and that is, that even a ſeparate Peace could not laſt Year have been made with *France*; tho' the Allies had been willing to recede from the 37th Article.

You will remember, it was the 8th of *June*, when Monſieur *Rouille* ſhew'd the Pentioner his Inſtructions, and declar'd finally, that his Maſter could not agree to that Article: Now ſuppoſe the Allies would have departed from it; could he have ſign'd the reſt? No; he had no Authority to do that: He muſt have made another Journey to *Verſailles*, to receive the King's Inſtructions, as well as to inform him of what had paſt. And we may eaſily gueſs at part of theſe Inſtructions, that the King when he found the Allies were content to recede from this Article, would have wanted Amendments to be made to ſome others that relate to *Spain*; particularly to have thoſe Words left out or explain'd in the 4th, where he is oblig'd to take *proper Meaſures*, in Concert with the Allies, to oblige his Grandſon to quit *Spain*. And 'tis probable he would pretend to new model ſome of the Articles relating to the *Emperor* and *Savoy*, while he agreed to them in the main: And who knows how much time might have been ſpun out, in going backwards and forwards; while in the midſt of his Conceſſions, ſome new Difficulties are ſtarted to delay ſigning, as long as he thinks fit? But ſuppoſing nothing of all this, he had a ſure Method in Reſerve to defeat the whole Treaty: The Firſt Thing to be executed by Vertue of it, was the Surrender of *Mons*, *Namur*, and *Charleroy*. This was to be done before the Firſt of *July*; but we are ſure it wou'd not have been done at all: For when the time came, *France* would have pretended it was not in her Power; for

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theſe Towns were in the Poſſeſſion of the Elector of *Bavaria*; and when *France* ſhould have demanded a Surrender of them, there was a ready Anſwer for him, That the Towns were the King of *Spain*'s, and that he could not Surrender them without his Order. This we are ſure would have been the Caſe; for tho' it did not come to bear, the Deſign was form'd, and could not be kept ſo ſecret, as not to take Wind: And thus the Treaty could never have had one Step made in the Execution of it; for the King of *Spain*, we may be ſure, would not order them to be given up, and 'tis as ſure, the Elector would never have given them up without Order, but to make Terms for himſelf, that he might be reſtor'd to his *Electorate*, which Affair had been left out of the Preliminaries, and was reſerv'd to be conſider'd in the Congreſs, that was to be open'd the very Day on which the Surrender of theſe Towns was to have commenc'd. He is a wiſe Man, that can tell how this Difficulty could have been overcome, without freſh Delays, and Loſs of Time; and the Diſputes this Point would have created, would have put the Execution of all the others ſo much backward; that I am apt to think this ſingle Point, with good Management, might have taken up as much of the Campaign, as *France* and the Elector had a mind to.

I may add, that it is the Opinion of ſome Knowing Men, that the Conceſſions *France* has ſeem'd to make in other Articles, were never intended to be Executed; and that they would never have been conſented to, but

but that they knew the Allies could not accept them, as long as the 37th was refus'd. The *English* Plenipotentiaries, they knew, were ty'd by a Vote of Parliament, to insist upon the Restitution of the whole *Spanish* Monarchy; and as long as that was so, they were sure, no other Concessions they could make, could hurt them in the End, tho' making of them was in the mean time of the greatest Service to them, by the seeming Sincerity and Earnestness it shew'd on their Part for Peace, and by the room that gave them to amuse and divide the Allies, and spin out the Time as long as they had Occasion for; and by giving them at last, a Handle to throw the Blame of breaking off the Treaty, upon them, for refusing such good Terms, for the sake of one that could not possibly be comply'd with: These, and the like Purposes, *France* serv'd by making such large Concessions as her Ministers have done to the Maritime Powers in these Articles; but this was only Sporting with them. As long as they kept one Link of this Chain of Articles in their own Hands, the Allies could not be at all the better for having the rest held out to them, nor themselves the worse. But whether this Opinion be true or not, what I have said before, renders it exceeding probable, that *France* never meant the Treaty should take place; they design'd nothing but to gain Time, and when that Purpose was serv'd, they broke off. 'Twas necessary for the King's Affairs, at the beginning of the Year, to make specious Offers of Peace, to quiet the Minds of his People, and induce the Allies

lies to defer the opening of the Campaign, the Severity of the hard Weather having reduc'd his Country to great Misery, and made it impossible for his Armies to take the Field early. But by *June* the Case was a little alter'd, and they began to recover from the Fright they had been in; Methods had been taken to remedy the extreme Want his Capital City labour'd under; an Inspection had been made of what Corn there was in the Provinces; great Quantities had been imported, or were expected from the *Levant*, and other Parts; there was a good Prospect of Summer-Corn every where; the D. of *Anjou* had gain'd a considerable Advantage over the *Portuguese*; and what 'tis probable weigh'd most of all with him, Mareschal *Villars* had made the King believe his Army was in a pretty good Condition; and assur'd him, he was so posted, that it would be impossible for the Allies to force the Entrenchments he had made, or draw him out of them; so that they had nothing to apprehend but a Siege; and that from the Disposition of the Allies, they thought could be no other, than that of *Ypres*, the Preparations for it being sent up the *Lys*; and this they hop'd would find the Allies work enough, for a Campaign that began so late; and perhaps the very Want and Famine which at first put them into great Consternation, they might upon further Thoughts see, was in some Respect their Security; since if the Allies should have the good Fortune to attack the *Mareschal* with Success, it would be impossible for them to make much use of their Victory, or penetrate far into a

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Country, where nothing was to be had; an Army may make a Famine, but they can't follow one. Theſe ſeem to have been the Motives that determin'd them to put an End to the Treaty, when they had drawn it out into length enough, to anſwer the Purpoſes for which it was begun: And then the Mask might ſafely be taken off. And this I take to be the true Reaſon, that Monſ. *Rouille* gave himſelf ſuch Airs in his laſt Conferences, and refus'd in the King's Name to agree to the 37th Article, without offering any Expedient at all for it; which was ſomething ſtrange, conſidering the Allies had before the Marquis *de Torcy*'s Departure, urg'd with ſo much Earneſtneſs the Neceſſity they were under to adhere to it. Therefore, I think, this can have no other Meaning in it, but that upon the *Marquis*'s Return, the State of *France* being throughly conſider'd, 'twas judg'd, that they might without any great Riſque hazard one Campaign more; and that determin'd the King to break off the Treaty as he did; which, by offering no Expedient, he ſhew'd his Affairs did no longer, in his Opinion, want.

This, tho' the beſt Account I can ſend you of this Affair, is, I am ſenſible, extremely ſhort of what it might be: But conſidering the Secrecy, with which things of this Nature are, and ought to be tranſacted, I flatter my ſelf, you will be content to find I know ſo much of them, rather than wonder I can't tell you more. And as imperfect as this Account is, if what I have ſaid be true in Fact,

and

and my Reflections juſt, you have ſo much Candor, that I am ſure you will allow I have prov'd theſe Three Things:

Firſt, That neither the D. of *M.* nor any other Miniſters of the Alliance, are juſtly to be Blam'd, for having contributed unneceſſarily to prolong the War, by their Management in theſe Negociations.

Secondly, That it was reaſonable and neceſſary for them to inſiſt on the 37th Article, in order to a good Peace. And,

Thirdly, That receding from that Article, would not then have procur'd a Separate Peace with *France*, whatever it would have done ſince. All which Points are ſubmitted to your impartial Conſideration, and better Judgment, by,

SIR,

Your moſt Faithful

Humble Servant.

POSTSCRIPT.

THE *EXAMINER* is extremely mistaken, if he thinks I shall enter the Lists with so prostitute a Writer, who can neither speak Truth, nor knows when he hears it. I shall not be mov'd with the Ignorance and Malice of a Mercenary Scribler, who treats the D. of *M.* and the Victorious Troops he has the Honour to Command, with so much Insolence, in so many of his Weekly Libels; and in one of them, *N.* 4. villanously calls him *a Cataline at the Head of a Mercenary Army*; Words, which, I trust, will not be easily forgotten. What I have said of the Management of the War, will, I doubt not, support it self against all his Attacks; who, were he much abler than he is, has met with more than his Match, in the most Ingenious Writer of the *MEDLEY*; and to his Correction I shall leave him.

FINIS.